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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article arises from a debate hosted at The University of Akron 
School of Law and reflects the arguments made by the author at that 
debate, which focused on the case of Greece v. Galloway.1 
At issue in Greece was the constitutionality of the town of Greece’s 
practice of opening its monthly town board meetings with an invocation 
given by a volunteer chaplain of the month.2  The United States Court of 
* Patrick Garry is a law professor at the University of South Dakota.  He received a J.D. and a Ph.D. 
in Constitutional History from the University of Minnesota.  
 1.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).  After the debate, the author 
prepared these written remarks.  After submitting these remarks, the United States Supreme Court 
decided the case, and the author submits this analysis without modification following the Supreme 
Court’s opinion.   
 2.  Members of many different religious traditions delivered invocations; the town allowed 
any interested person to offer an invocation and never declined a request to deliver an invocation 
before a Board Meeting.  Pet. App 20a, 125a.  Although the great majority of the invocations were 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit, using the endorsement test, ruled that 
this practice violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.3 
II. THE SHORT ANSWER: MARSH SUPPORTS THE PRAYER PRACTICE 
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court approved the practice of 
opening legislative sessions with a prayer delivered by a state-employed 
chaplain.4  The Court specifically ruled that the use of a prayer to open a 
legislative session did not constitute an establishment of religion but was 
“simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country.”5  The Court articulated two exceptions: (1) if the 
government acts with an impermissible motive in selecting the prayer-
givers; or (2) if the government uses the prayer practice to proselytize on 
behalf of a particular religion.6 
Even though the Second Circuit did not find that either of the two 
Marsh exceptions existed in Galloway, the court struck down the 
prayer.7  Instead of the Marsh “historical traditions” test, which was 
previously used in Van Orden v. Perry to uphold a Ten Commandments 
display, the Second Circuit applied the “endorsement test” to strike 
down the prayer practice.8 
The Marsh test is the most relevant test in evaluating the 
constitutionality of legislative prayer and, thus, should dictate that the 
prayer practice in Greece is not judicially prohibited. 
given by Christian representatives, recent invocation-givers included a Buddhist, a person whose 
religion was listed as Cherokee Indian, and a Wiccan High Priest.  C.A. App. A1053-55.  
Furthermore, the town did not monitor the content of the invocations given.  Pet. App. 8a.  See Brief 
for Petitioner at 6-7, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 
3935899, at *7. 
 3.  Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 29-31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 4.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).  The Court found there was nothing 
unconstitutional about having the prayer given by the same state-paid, Christian-denomination 
chaplain who had given the opening prayer for sixteen years. Id. at 793-94. 
 5.  Id. at 792.  According to Marsh, “historical evidence sheds light not only on what the 
draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause 
applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress.”  Id. at 790.  Additionally, because 
legislative prayer was a common practice preceding and during the constitutional period, the 
historical approach of Marsh was consistent with constitutional reality, finding that legislative 
prayer was not an establishment of religion.  Id. at 786-92. 
 6.  Id. at 793-95. 
 7.  On appeal, respondents dropped their argument that the town had intentionally 
discriminated against non-Christians, and the Second Circuit found there was “no religious animus” 
in the town’s invocation practice.  Pet. App. 22a.  See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 3935899, at *8. 
 8.  Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30; Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, syllabus (2005).  
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III. THE LONG ANSWER: THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE 
A. The Confusing State of Jurisprudence 
Perhaps the unprecedented decision by the Second Circuit, as well 
as the striking down of a long-established practice, occurred in large part 
because of the confusing nature of the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  This confusing and convoluted jurisprudence has 
been widely noted by scholars and court observers.9  A prime example 
of such confusion and inconsistency occurred in 2005 when the Supreme 
Court decided two similar cases, both involving public displays of the 
Ten Commandments, with exactly opposite results and essentially using 
three different constitutional tests.10 
There is great doctrinal disarray in the Supreme Court’s use of its 
Establishment Clause tests.11  The oldest test, the Lemon test, has been 
abandoned by the Court.12  The Marsh historical traditions test was 
virtually ignored by the Second Circuit; instead, it used the endorsement 
test, which was initially intended to be more accommodating to the 
historical role and presence of religion in society.13  On the other hand, 
the coercion test, previously used nearly exclusively with public prayers, 
was not used or referenced by the Second Circuit.14 
The number of different tests, along with the confusing ways in 
which those tests are applied, means that courts can pick and choose 
among tests so as to reach and justify almost any decision.  However, 
despite the plethora of tests, the Supreme Court has never defined the 
most crucial term of the Establishment Clause – the term 
“establishment.”  Instead, it has used tests to determine whether the 
 9.  See Patrick M. Garry, Distorting the Establishment Clause into an Individual Dissenter’s 
Right, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 661-62 (2013). 
 10.  Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, paragraph one of the syllabus 
(2005) (striking down a frame display of the Ten Commandments using the secular purpose test), 
with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685-92 (upholding the display under the Marsh test); see also id. at 
701-06 (Breyer, J., concurring) (using his own legal judgment test as swing vote to uphold display). 
 11.  See Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality, 57 FLA. L. 
REV. 1, 3-6 (2005). 
 12.  See id. at 6 (describing the Court utilizing different tests before settling on the neutrality 
approach). 
 13.  The test, first used in Lynch v. Donnelly, upheld a public display of a Christmas crèche.  
465 U.S. 668 (1984).  Then, in Salazar v. Buono, the test was used to strike down a memorial to 
World War I veterans built decades earlier by private groups and funds, but using a Roman cross.  
559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
 14.  For cases applying the coercion test to public prayers, see, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992). 
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“symptoms” of establishment are occurring.  But this practice has 
produced, in Justice Kennedy’s words, a “jurisprudence of minutia,” 
extending the reach of that clause to the most discreet, insular, and 
momentary interactions between government and religion.15 
B. The Purpose of the Establishment Clause 
The issue in Greece is not the appropriateness, sensitivity, or 
wisdom of the prayers.  It is not whether religiously-motivated people 
can act with unkindness and inconsideration, or whether religiously-
motivated people always live up to their beliefs.  It is not about whether 
some people are offended by the prayers.  The Establishment Clause is 
not about feelings, just as the Speech Clause is not about the feelings of 
people who disagree with or are offended by other people’s speech.  The 
issue in Greece is whether the government of that town acted or 
exercised a power forbidden by the First Amendment.16 
The Establishment Clause forbids laws “respecting” an 
establishment of religion.17  It does not forbid laws accommodating, 
facilitating, or supporting religion or religious freedom.18  The 
endorsement test, as it has evolved, tends to equate establishment with 
people’s feelings of offense or marginalization when confronting public 
displays or expressions of religion.19  A more historically accurate 
definition, however, has been provided by Michael McConnell.20  He 
reminds us that, during the constitutional period, establishments of 
religion were characterized by factors such as government financial 
support of a religion, government control of church doctrine or 
personnel, and government assignment of important civil functions to a 
religion.21  This definition of establishment, contrary to the endorsement 
test, focuses on the actions of the state and the institutional connections 
or interferences between government and particular religious groups. 
The scope and nature of the Establishment Clause should also be 
viewed in connection with the scope and nature of the Free Exercise 
 15.  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 16.  Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818. 
 17.  U.S. Const. amend. I. 
 18.  The First Amendment must allow the government to “respect the religious nature of our 
people and accommodate the public service to their spiritual needs.”  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 
306, 314 (1952). 
 19.  See Garry, supra note 10, at 678-81 (discussing the endorsement test as a form of 
dissenter’s right because of a fear of marginalizing dissenters). 
 20.  Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131-76 (2003). 
 21.  Id. 
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Clause.  For instance, the Establishment Clause is often seen as the only 
protector against public-religious interactions that may be overreaching, 
coercive, or intimidating to objectors.22  However, the Free Exercise 
Clause, as the dominant liberty clause, protects against government 
actions that coerce, infringe on, or intimidate an individual’s exercise or 
non-exercise of religious beliefs.23 
The Establishment Clause also works in tandem with the Free 
Exercise Clause.24  Both clauses are complimentary to each other, 
insofar as both serve the cause of religious liberty.25  Whereas the Free 
Exercise Clause is the primary religious liberty clause, serving as the 
individual or minority rights clause, the Establishment Clause is more 
narrowly focused on the group or institutional aspect of religion.26  The 
Establishment Clause is not an individual rights clause; it is a clause 
focused on the institutional liberty and autonomy of religious 
organizations.27  A government establishment of religion (such as 
occurred with the Church of England) violates the liberty and autonomy 
of the religion that is taken over by the government, as well as the liberty 
of all other religious institutions consequently discriminated against or 
handicapped by having another religion receive preferential government 
treatment.28 
As a religious liberty clause, the Establishment Clause is not a 
secularism clause; its primary effect is not to ensure a secular society, 
free from the public presence of religion.29  Nothing in the constitutional 
debates or history suggests that the First Amendment framers wanted to 
achieve and then ensure a secular society.  Indeed, the overwhelming 
evidence points to just the opposite desire.30  The First Amendment, by 
recognizing religion as the first liberty, recognizes the specialness of 
religion to the framers and drafters.  This is not to say that the 
Establishment Clause does not, to some degree, carry indirect benefits 
for secularism.  However, secularism is not the Clause’s primary 
purpose. 
 22.  See Patrick M. Garry, The Institutional Side of Religious Liberty: A New Model of the 
Establishment Clause, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1166 (2004). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  For a discussion on the relationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses, the nature of each, and the ways in which they complement each other, see id. at 1158-
1160, 1163-1170. 
 25.  See Garry, supra note 10, at 662-68. 
 26.  See id. at 662. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See id. at 666-68. 
 29.  See id. at 684, 688-90. 
 30.  See id. at 670-74. 
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One way in which the Establishment Clause is used as a secularism 
clause is its attempted application as a “heckler’s veto.”  Primarily 
through the endorsement test, as used by the Second Circuit, the 
Establishment Clause has been interpreted as a “reverse” Free Exercise 
Clause, aimed at protecting an individual dissenter’s right to be free 
from exposure to the public presence of religion.31  Under this 
interpretation, the Free Exercise Clause protects the freedom to practice 
religion, whereas the Establishment Clause protects a freedom from the 
public practice of religion.  But again, nothing in the constitutional 
history suggests that the Establishment Clause was meant to be a 
“reverse” Free Exercise Clause, nor that it was intended to be what the 
Speech Clause was not – i.e., a heckler’s veto.32  Indeed, Marsh 
contradicted a heckler’s veto view of the Establishment Clause by 
focusing on government intent rather than on the prayer’s effect on 
listeners.33 
C. Historical Proof of an Accommodating Establishment Clause 
As recognized in Marsh, there was much interplay between religion 
and the public square at the time the Bill of Rights was passed.34  
Religion played a prominent role not only in society but in the framers’ 
conception of democracy and civic life.35  According to the Marsh 
Court, the Establishment Clause was not intended to eliminate religion’s 
role or interplay with society.36  To the contrary, the Clause was meant 
to accommodate the types of relationships between religion and the 
public square that existed at the time of the First Amendment’s framing 
and ratifying.37 
 31.  Id. at 685. 
 32.  The Establishment Clause does not protect against feelings of offense.  “People may take 
offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in 
every case show a violation.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 597.  See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (refusing to apply the Establishment Clause “using a modified 
heckler’s veto” on behalf of perceptions of certain people who disagree with the perceived 
message). 
 33.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.  Moreover, in Van Orden, Justice Thomas found the 
impressions of dissenters to the display irrelevant to any Establishment Clause ruling.  545 U.S. at 
696-98 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 34.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-88. 
 35.  See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); JOHN 
WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES (2000).  See also Patrick M. Garry, The Democratic Aspect of the Establishment Clause, 
59 MERCER L. REV. 595, 611-17 (2008); Garry, supra note 12, at 15-24. 
 36.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91. 
 37.  The Establishment Clause permits the accommodation of religion, for instance, in 
solemnizing certain pubic events with invocations.  As the Court has stated, government 
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Legislative prayer was one such interplay that, as ruled by Marsh, 
was meant to be accommodated by the Establishment Clause.38  Indeed, 
public prayer was very common and accepted during the constitutional 
period.  For instance, this country’s first four presidents (the ones most 
connected to the constitutional period) – Washington, Adams, Jefferson 
and Madison – all declared numerous days of national prayer and 
oversaw religious services held in federal government buildings.39  The 
day the First Amendment was adopted, Congress responded with a 
prayer of thanksgiving.40  When the Northwest Ordinance was 
reenacted, the First Congress declared that religion was necessary for 
good government.41 
D. Full Circle Back to Marsh 
The discussion of history brings the argument back, full circle, to 
the precedent and rationale of Marsh.42  The Court then, as it should 
now, used history as an important guide in determining the meaning and 
purpose of the Establishment Clause.  History provides a more objective 
and consistent meaning than that provided by the more subjective 
endorsement test.43 
Problems with the endorsement test are evident in the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Galloway.44  The Second Circuit recognized that 
prayer could not be banned, that prayer of some sort was allowed, and 
that the judiciary should not become enmeshed in determining the proper 
content of prayer.45  Furthermore, the Second Circuit recognized that 
Marsh prohibited government parsing of prayer – e.g., to determine if a 
prayer is too religious.46  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit violated all 
“accommodation, acknowledgement, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political 
and cultural heritage.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part).  See also Garry, supra note 12, at 39-41. 
 38.  For a discussion of the Establishment Clause and accommodation, see Garry, supra note 
25, at 1171-73. 
 39.  See Garry, supra note 10, at 670-74. 
 40.  Id. at 672 & n. 46. 
 41.  Id. at 672 & n. 44. 
 42.  Marsh, 463 U.S. 783. 
 43.  The endorsement test—relying on the Court’s conclusion as to what a reasonable 
observer might perceive about a government interaction with religion and placing the determination 
of ‘establishment’ in the perception of the individual perceiver—is “formless, unanchored, 
subjective.”  Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. District, 687 F.3d 840, 872 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
 44.  Galloway, 681 F.3d 20. 
 45.  Id. at 33-34. 
 46.  Id. at 31. 
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these principles by delving into the content of the delivered prayers so as 
to determine whether they might have made certain objectors feel like 
outsiders.47  But this approach, relying on each court’s individual 
assessment of the psychological effects of individual prayers can 
ultimately produce only one workable result – the banning of all prayer 
in such venues.48  On the other hand, if a court’s approach results in the 
banning of all prayer, this in turn could cause violations of the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, promote government hostility toward 
religion, and effectively cement the Establishment Clause as a heckler’s 
veto.49 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In an increasingly secular society, secularism is important.  But 
secularism is the result of political and social forces.  It is not the 
mandate of the First Amendment.  The Establishment Clause obviously 
gives room for secularism to flourish, if society so wishes.  But the 
purpose of the Clause is not to further secularism. 
The Establishment Clause was not meant to protect society from 
religion, but to protect religious institutions from government 
interference or discrimination.  History provides the most objective and 
accurate guide to applying the Establishment Clause.  When courts can 
follow history, they ought to do so.  Granted, history may not provide a 
clear answer in some circumstances; but when it does provide such an 
answer, as with the practice of legislative prayer, it should be followed.  
Marsh follows history, and the Supreme Court should follow Marsh in 
its decision in Greece.  If it fails to follow history, long-entrenched 
practices such as presidential inauguration prayers, invocations before 
congressional sessions, the national motto, and the opening of Supreme 
Court sessions (“God save this Honorable Court”) will be thrown into 
 47.  Marsh stated that the “content of the prayer is of no concern to judges” unless evidence 
shows that “the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief.”  463 U.S. at 794-95.  A judicial parsing of prayer language “not 
only embroils judges in precisely those intrareligious controversies that the Constitution requires 
[the judiciary] to avoid, but also imposes on [it] a task that [it is] incompetent to perform.”  Rubin v. 
City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1100 (9th Cir. 2013).  The endorsement test’s approach of 
determining when prayers are too religious or when they are sufficiently absent of religious content 
places the Court into the role of “a national theology board.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 678 (Kennedy, 
J.). 
 48.  The endorsement test is “no test at all, but merely a label for the judge’s largely 
subjective impressions.”  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 
815 (1993). 
 49.  The law must avoid “an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with 
our history and our precedents.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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doubt and conflict. 
 
